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Abstract— In this paper, spectrum access in cognitive radio
networks is modeled as a repeated auction game subject to
monitoring and entry costs. For secondary users, sensing costs
are incurred as the result of primary users’ activity. Further-
more, each secondary user pays the cost of transmissions upon
successful bidding for a channel. Knowledge regarding other
secondary users’ activity is limited due to the distributed nature
of the network. The resulting formulation is thus a dynamic game
with incomplete information. In this paper, an efficient bidding
learning algorithm is proposed based on the outcome of past
transactions. As demonstrated through extensive simulations, the
proposed distributed scheme outperforms a myopic one-stage
algorithm, and can achieve a good balance between efficiency
and fairness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent studies have shown that despite claims of spectral
scarcity, the actual licensed spectrum remains unoccupied for
long periods of time [1]. Thus, cognitive radio (CR) systems
have been proposed [2] in order to efficiently exploit these
spectral holes. CRs or secondary users (SUs) are wireless
devices that can intelligently monitor and adapt to their
environment, hence, they are able to share the spectrum with
the licensed primary users (PUs), operating whenever the
PUs are idle. Three key design challenges are active topics
of research in cognitive radio networks, namely, distributed
implementation, spectral efficiency, and the tradeoff between
sensing and spectrum access.
Previous studies have tackled various aspects of spectrum
sensing and spectrum access. In [3], the performance of
spectrum sensing, in terms of throughput, is investigated when
the SUs share their instantaneous knowledge of the channel.
The work in [4] studies the performance of different detectors
for spectrum sensing, while in [5] spatial diversity methods are
proposed for improving the probability of detecting the PU by
the SUs. Other aspects of spectrum sensing are discussed in
[6] and [7]. Furthermore, spectrum access has also received
increased attention, e.g., [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. In [8],
a dynamic programming approach is proposed to allow the
SUs to maximize their channel access time while taking into
account a penalty factor from any collision with the PU. The
work in [8] (and the references therein) establish that, in
practice, the sensing time of CR networks is large and affects
the access performance of the SUs. In [9], the authors model
the spectrum access problem as a non-cooperative game, and
propose learning algorithms to find the correlated equilibria
of the game. Non-cooperative solutions for dynamic spectrum
access are also proposed in [10] while taking into account
changes in the SUs’ environment such as the arrival of new
PUs, among others.
When multiple SUs compete for spectral opportunities, the
issues of fairness and efficiency arise. On one hand, it is desir-
able for an SU to access a channel with high availability. On
the other hand, the effective achievable rate of an SU decreases
when contending with many SUs over the most available
channel. Consequently, efficiency of spectrum utilization in the
system reduces. Therefore, an SU should explore transmission
opportunities in other channels if available and refrain from
transmission in the same channel all the time. Intuitively,
diversifying spectrum access in both frequency (exploring
more channels) and time (refraining from continuous trans-
mission attempts) would be beneficial to achieving fairness
among multiple SUs, in that SUs experiencing poorer channel
conditions are not starved in the long run.
The objective of this paper is to design a mechanism that
enables fair and efficient sharing of spectral resources among
SUs. We model spectrum access in cognitive radio networks
as a repeated auction game with entry and monitoring costs.
Auctioning the spectral opportunities is carried out repeatedly.
At the beginning of each period, each SU that wishes to
participate in the spectrum access submits a bid to a coor-
dinator based on its view of the channel and past auction
history. Knowledge regarding other secondary users’ activities
is limited due to the distributed nature of the network. The
resulting formulation is thus a dynamic game with incomplete
information. The bidder with the highest bid gains spectrum
access. Entry fees are charged for all bidders who participate
in the auction irrespective of the outcome of the auction. An
SU can also choose to stay out (SO) of the current round, in
which case no entry fee is incurred. At the end of each auction
period, information regarding bidding and allocation are made
available to all SUs, and in turn a monitoring fee is incurred.
To achieve efficient bidding, a learning algorithm is pro-
posed based on the outcome of past transactions. Each SU
decides on local actions with the objective of increasing its
long-term cost effectiveness. As demonstrated through exten-
sive simulations, the proposed distributed scheme outperforms
a myopic one-stage algorithm where an SU always participates
in the spectrum access game in both single channel and multi-
channel networks.
A comment is in order on the feasibility of such an auction-
2based approach to spectrum access in practice. Due to com-
mercial and industrial exploitation and different stake holders’
interests, the functional architectures and cognitive signaling
schemes are currently under discussion within standardization
forums, including IEEE SCC 41 and ETSI TC RRS (Recon-
figurable Radio Systems). Cognitive pilot channel (CPC) has
gained attention as a potential enabler of data-aided mitigation
techniques between secondary and primary communication
systems as well as a mechanism to support optimized radio
resource and data management across heterogeneous networks.
In CPC, a common control channel is used to provide the
information corresponding to the operators, Radio Access
Technology and frequencies allocated in a given area. We can
thus leverage the intelligence of the CPC coordinator and the
control channel to solicit bidding and broadcast the outcome
of auctions.
The main contributions of this paper are:
1) We have formulated the spectrum access problem in
cognitive radio networks as a repeated auction game.
2) A distributed learning algorithm is proposed for single-
channel networks, and a non-regret learning algorithm
is investigated for multi-channel networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the system model and terminology are introduced. Mechanism
design of the repeated auction with learning is presented in
Section III. Simulation results are given in Section IV followed
by conclusions and a discussion of future work in Section V.
II. PHYSICAL LAYER AND SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cognitive radio network consisting of K
channels to be occupied by N SUs who compete repeatedly
for access to the channels at each discrete time t. At time t, the
ith SU can reasonably estimate its channel rate θti,k in the kth
channel while having no knowledge of that of other SUs. In
other words, each SU has imperfect information. We assume
that both N and K are known to all SUs. The primary user’s
activity follows Bernoulli distribution, i.e., at time t, the kth
channel is occupied with probability Θk at time t. Without
loss of generality, all secondary users use a common transmit
power P0 with a thermal noise level σ2 at the basestation.
The channel gain for the ith secondary user is assume to be
Gih
t
i,k, where Gi is the propagation path loss and hti,k follows
the Rayleigh fading distribution. The rate for the ith user on
the kth channel at time t can be written as
θti,k =W log2
(
1 +
Gih
t
i,k
σ2
)
, (1)
where W is the bandwidth for each channel. All channels are
assumed to have the same bandwidth for ease of exposition.
At time t, an SU may incur two types of costs, namely, the
cost of accessing ct, which accounts for the energy expenditure
needed for spectrum access; and the cost of monitoring et,
which is the cost of sensing and subscribing to the control
channel (e.g., CPC) to obtain information regarding past
auctions. The spectrum access among SUs is modeled as a
repeated auction. The access cost, also called the entry free
is charged only when the user decides to participate in the
Fig. 1. Illustration of the System Model
auction at time t. On the other hand, SUs always need to
pay for the monitoring cost regardless of their decisions. At
the beginning of a slot t, an SU chooses whether to stay out
(SO) or participate in spectrum access. If the latter option
is chosen, the SU (or bidder) sends a confidential message
to the coordinator (or auctioneer) containing its bid. Let the
bid submitted by SU i be mti, which is a K × 1 vector with
component mti,k for the kth channel. We define the set of
actions of user i’s opponents as
mt−i = {m
t
j |j ∈ N\i}. (2)
The cost incurred is thus
et + ct1(m
t
i,k 6= SO),
where 1(·) is the indicator function.
In each round, the bidder with the maximum bid wins
and is granted the spectrum access opportunity. A payment is
incurred accordingly. There are two key differences compared
to existing spectrum access models, where upon sensing an
idle channel, all SUs contend for spectrum access. First, an
SU may choose to stay out if participating in the spectrum
access game is deemed unfavorable (because of low data rate
or large number of contending SUs). Second, the transmission
opportunity in each available channel is granted only to a
single SU after the auction. Therefore, no further contention
will occur. Each SU is assumed to follow a symmetric strategy
based on its local state and information learned.
Figure 1 gives an illustration of the system model. An
analogy can be drawn in casinos, in which different gamblers
try to select which table to play and how much to bet. Each
secondary user shall decide which channel to sense and bid
for, and how much the bid should be. These two issues will
be addressed in the following sections for single-channel (i.e.,
K = 1) and multi-channel (i.e., K > 1) cognitive radio
networks, respectively.
III. REPEATED AUCTION WITH LEARNING
In this section, we investigate the spectrum access problem
among multiple SUs in cognitive radio networks. We first
3discuss the auction mechanism and then define the utility
function. Finally, an efficient bidding mechanism in repeated
auctions with learning is proposed.
A. Mechanism
Recall from Section II that at the beginning of a slot t, an
SU decides to either place a bid, or stay out and monitor the
results. Based on the SUs’ actions, the allocation strategy at
time t for channel k can be written as
Xt(k)
∆
= {χt1,k, . . . , χ
t
n,k|χi,k ∈ {0, 1} ∧
∑
i
χti,k = 1}, ∀k.
If SU i chooses to stay out, then its allocation equals zero,
i.e.,
χti,k(m
t
i,k = SO) = 0. (3)
The SU with the highest bid would win the right to access the
channel, i.e.,
χti,k(m
t
i,k 6= SO) =


1, mti,k > m
t
j,k, ∀j 6= i;
and primary user does not exist
0, Otherwise.
(4)
The winner would pay
pti,k =


0, mti,k = SO or ∃j,m
t
j,k > m
t
i,k;
and primary user exists
ψti,k, Otherwise
(5)
for its bid, where
ψti,k =
{
mti,k, First Price Auction;
max(mt−i,k), Second Price Auction.
(6)
For ease of presentation, a second price auction is assumed
in the remaining discussion of the paper. The auction mecha-
nism can be written as follows:
1) SU i observes its current valuation (rate) θti,k;
2) SU i decides mti,k;
3) The mechanism implements χti,k and ψti,k; and
4) SU i observes χti,k and pti,k.
Mechanisms and results for “one-shot” auction with and
without entry fees have been well established in the liter-
ature [20]. Typically, a symmetric and known strategy is
assumed. In our formulation, at each stage of the auction, an
SU decides on its action according to the bidding history mon-
itored thus far. The number of participants varies from stage
to stage depending on the SU’s valuation and its knowledge
regarding other players.
B. Utility Function
To assess the expenditure in the course of the game, we
define the accumulated cost for SU i at time t as
cti(h
t−1
i ) =
K∑
k=1
t−1∑
τ=1
[
pτi,kχ
τ
i,k + ct1(m
τ
i,k 6= 0) + et
]
, (7)
where ht−1i is the bidding history observed by SU i up to
time t. The cost includes payment for the spectrum access
opportunity, entry and monitoring fees over the history and
across the different channels.
The accumulated reward of SU i is given by
rti(h
t−1
i ) =
K∑
k=1
t−1∑
τ=1
θτi,kχ
τ
i,k. (8)
The utility is thus defined as the accumulated reward over
the total cost, i.e.,
γti (h
t−1
i ) =
rti(h
t−1
i )
cti(h
t−1
i )
. (9)
The utility function is essentially the revenue to cost ratio
of the SU’s actions over time. An SU will try to maximize its
utility. Intuitively, when an SU’s valuation is low compared
with others, it is beneficial for the SU to stay out so that
the entry cost is not incurred unnecessarily. On the other
hand, staying out all the time leads to zero accumulation of
revenue and starvation of the SU, and thus should be avoided.
Optimizing (9) is difficult even in a centralized manner due
to the large decision space. Therefore, distributed heuristic
learning algorithms are warranted to determine mti,k at each
SU individually.
At time t, an SU decides whether to participate in the
auction and if so, its bid. If SU i’s decision is to participate
(or mti,k 6= SO), it can be proved straightforwardly that SU i’s
dominating strategy is to bid its own valuation in the second
price auction. More formally, we have
Proposition 1: The equilibrium of the repeated auction with
utility function (9) consists of each bidder using the following
strategy at time t:
mti,k =
{
SO f(θti,k, h
i
it− 1) ≥ 0
θti,k else,
(10)
where f(θti,k, h
t−1
i ) is a function of SU i’s current valuation
and bidding history. The above strategy implies a thresh-
olding criterion for participating in the game. The form of
f(θti,k, h
t−1
i ) differs in the single channel and multi-channel
scenarios, and will be discussed in more detail in subsequent
sections.
C. Repeated Auction in a Single Channel
When there is only a single channel, we can drop k in
the notation. An SU stays out of bidding if it deems that
participation is likely to reduce its payoff. Formally,mti = SO,
if
γt+1i (θ
t
i , h
t−1
i : m
t
i = SO) ≥ Eθt
−i
(
γt+1i (θ
t
i , h
t−1
i : m
t
i = θ
t
i)
)
.
(11)
In (11), the expectation is taken over all possible valuations
of SU i’s opponents.
In the first auction, no past history is available. The same
thresholding function is applied at each SU under the assump-
tion that the valuations of SUs are independent and identically
distributed with cumulative distribution function (CDF) F (·)
and probability density function (PDF) f(·). Therefore, the
CDF and PDF of the second largest valuation among N users
are G(y) = F (y)N−1 and g(y) = (N − 1)F (y)N−2f(y),
respectively. Let r1i = c1i = 1, for all i. The strategy for the
first auction is stated as follows.
4Proposition 2: In the first auction, m1i = SO if and only if
θ1i < c, where
θG(θ) =
e1
1 + c1
.
Proof: Since c is the lowest valuation of any SU to
participate in the auction, only when all other SUs have a
valuation less than θ will SU i with valuation θ win the
auction. Therefore,
γ1i (θ
1
i : m
1
i = SO) =
1
1 + e1
,
and
Eθ1
−i
(
γ1i (θ
1
i : m
1
i = θ)
)
=
1 +G(θ)θ
1 + e1 + c1
.
To satisfy (11), we have
θG(θ) =
e1
1 + c1
.
Direct evaluation of (11) is difficult after the first auction.
This is because the accumulated reward, cost and current
valuation are only available to each SU individually (although
the auctioneer provides the information regarding the highest
bid and associated payment at the end of each stage). Next,
we introduce a simple heuristic to approximate the right hand
side of (11). SU i maintains a private threshold value θi,
initiated according to Proposition 2. At time t, SU i updates
γti (θ
t
i : m
t
i = SO) =
rt
i
ct
i
+et
. Furthermore,
Eθt
−i
(
γti(θ
t
i : m
t
i = θ
t
i)
)
≈
rti + θ
t
i − θi
cti + et + ct
.
SU i’s action is thus,
mti =
{
SO
rt
i
ct
i
+et
>
rt
i
+θt
i
−θi
ct
i
+et+ct
θti else
. (12)
At the end of stage t, the SU obtains the largest bid and
associated payment. If SU i chooses to stay out, but the
payment of the winner is less than θi, its θi is set to the
payment amount. Otherwise, θi remains the same. On the other
hand, if SU i participates in the auction but either loses the
auction or is required to make a payment higher than θi, its
θi is set to the payment amount. To avoid fluctuation of θi
estimates, a moving average of old and new values can be
applied.
The above mechanism is summarized in Algorithm 1.
D. Non-Regret Algorithm for the Multi-channel Case
In this section, we will address the spectrum access problem
in multi-channel networks. A class of algorithms called regret-
matching [19] is explored. The resulting stationary solution
of the learning algorithm exhibits no regret by setting the
probability of a particular action proportional to the “regrets”
for not having played other actions. In particular, for any two
distinct actions mti 6= m¯ti at every time t, the regret of SU i
at time t for not playing m¯ti is
R
t
i(m
t
i, m¯
t
i) := max{D
t
i(m
t
i, m¯
t
i), 0}, (13)
input : Number of SU’s n, monitoring et and entry fee
ct at time t
init : Set θi = θ s.t., θG(θ) = e11+c1
a = γti (θi,t : m
t
i = SO);
b =
rt
i
+θt
i
−θi
ct
i
+et+ct
;
if a > b or PU detected then
mi,t = SO;
end
else
mi,t = θi,t
end
Let the maximum payment at stage t be pm(t);
if mi,t = SO and pm(t) < θi then
θi = pm(t) ∗ α+ θi ∗ (1 − α)
end
if mi,t 6= SO and (χi,t = 0 or pm(t) ≥ θi) then
θi = pm(t) ∗ α+ θi ∗ (1 − α)
end
Algorithm 1: Strategy in single-channel spectrum access
where
Dti(m
t
i, m¯
t
i) =
1
ν
∑
t−ν≤τ<t
(rti(m¯
t
i, m¯
t
−i)− r
t
i(m
t
i,m
t
−i)),
(14)
withν denoting the size of time window. Dti(mti, m¯ti) has the
interpretation of average payoff that SU i would have obtained,
if it had bid m¯ti every time in the past instead of choosing
mti. The expression RTi (mti, m¯ti) can be viewed as a measure
of the average regret. In the context of spectrum access in
multi-channel networks, the alternative actions correspond to
participating in the auction game in different channels1. The
probability Pti for SU i to join auctions in channel k is a
linear function of the regret. Here P ti is a K-by-1 probability
vector with
∑K
k=1 P
t
i,k = 1. Define 1(mti) as the indication
vector for whether or not SU i competes in the kth channel.
The detailed regret-matching algorithm is given in Algorithm
2. The complexity of the algorithm is O(K) and can be
implemented distributively. Furthermore, its convergence has
been proved in the literature [19]. Once SU i chooses the
channel to access, its action is decided by Algorithm 1. Note
that even though an SU can access only one channel at a
time, the bidding history on all data channels is made available
through the control channel to all SUs.
IV. SIMULATION
In this section, we investigate the performance of the
proposed schemes by simulations. We construct a network of
dimensions 100m-by-100m, in which the SUs are randomly
placed. All SUs transmit to a base station at a fixed location
1000m away from the center of the network. The propagation
loss exponent is set to be 3. The common transmission power
level of all SUs is set to be 100mW and the noise level at
1Each user decides which channel to bid on, and then uses the value θt
i,k
for bidding that channel.
5init : The probability of SU i, P1i is set arbitrarily
foreach t = 1, 2, 3, ... do
Find Dti(mti, m¯ti) as in (14);
Find average regret Rti(mti, m¯ti) as in (13);
Pt+1i (m¯ti) = 1κR
t
i(m
t
i, m¯
t
i)1(m¯ti), ∀mti 6= m¯ti;
Pt+1i (mti) =
[
1−
∑
m¯
t
i
6=mt
i
Pt+1i (m¯ti)
]
1(mti), where
κ is a certain constant that is sufficiently large;
end
Algorithm 2: Non-regret learning algorithm for the multi-
channel case
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Fig. 2. Convergence of repeated auction games under the proposed and
myopic schemes. 2 SUs, 1 channel
-90dbm. A unit bandwidth is assumed with frame length at
100µs, and Doppler frequency 100Hz. We set α = 0.05 and
ν = 10. The proposed schemes are compared to a myopic
scheme, in which SUs always participate in the auctions.
Single channel: First, we consider a simple 2-user case to
understand the convergence of the proposed algorithm. Figure
2 shows a snapshot of the change of the utility function γi,t
for user i over time. The entry and monitoring fees are fixed
at ct = 10 and et = 1, respectively. From the figure, we
can see that the proposed scheme converges quickly and then
tracks the changes in the channel. Furthermore, compared to
the myopic scheme in which the SUs always bid, the utilities
attained are higher for both users. This is because the SUs
can decide whether to bid or not based on its valuation and
outcome of past auctions. Between time 4000 and 6000, a
primary user is active, and all SUs stay out of the auction
but still pay for the monitoring fee. The average value of
gamma decreases during that period of time. After the primary
user stops transmitting, the auction game resumes. Since the
effects of a primary user are very predictable, in the remaining
simulations we assume the primary user is always idle.
In Figure 3, we demonstrate the effects of entry and moni-
toring costs on performance. The proposed scheme is shown to
achieve better performance in all cases and the average gain is
up to 15%. We can see that when the monitoring fee is fixed,
as the entry fee (ct) increases, the average utility decreases.
This is expected as it is more expensive to participate in the
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Fig. 3. Effects of monitoring and entry costs. 2 SUs
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Fig. 4. Fairness achieved by SUs
auction. Furthermore, the gap between the utilities attained by
the proposed scheme and the myopic scheme also increases.
This is because in the proposed scheme SUs are selective and
would participate in the auction only if they are likely to win.
The myopic scheme would incur high losses in revenue as the
result of a higher entry cost.
In Figure 4, we show the fairness achieved in the proposed
and myopic schemes. We adopt Jain’s fairness index [21]:
F =
(
∑N
i=1 γi)
2
N
∑N
i=1 γ
2
i
.
Clearly, F is between 0 and 1. The larger the value, the better
the fairness is. We can see that the proposed scheme results in
fairer resource allocation compared with the myopic bidding
scheme. As the entry cost increases, the fairness of the myopic
scheme also decreases. This is because users experiencing
worse channels are repeatedly penalized by losing the game
and paying entry fees. In comparison, when e = 10 and e = 5,
the proposed scheme achieves slightly better fairness as the
entry cost c increases.
In the next set of experiments, we set the number of SUs to
be N = 16. Figure 5 (ct = et = 5) compares the SUs’ average
valuation R, average bid b and instantaneous bid at time 5000,
6Fig. 5. Valuation and bids of SUs
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Fig. 6. Utility achieved as the number of SUs changes
respectively. Several observations are in order. First, the users
with a higher average value generally agree with users with
a higher average bid though not always. This is because the
average bid also includes the case in which an SU stays out
(treated as a zero bid). Second, as expected, not all the users
are bidding in each slot; only the users with low cost and high
chance of winning would participate.
In Figure 6 and Figure 7, we show the utility and fairness
as a function of the number of SUs varying from 2 to 16.
The costs are set as ct = 10 and et = 1, respectively. We can
see that as the number of SUs increases, the utility decreases
due to limited radio resources. The fairness also decreases
since there might be more chances for users to dominate when
the number of users is large. The proposed scheme has better
performance in both utility and fairness, compared with the
myopic scheme. The gain in utility ranges from 12% to 25%.
Multiple channels: In this set of experiments, we study
the performance and convergence of a two-user two-channel
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
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Fig. 7. Fairness achieved as the number of SUs changes
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user 2 NRL
Fig. 8. Utility in two-SU two-channel networks under different algorithms
case. The parameters are set as ct = 5, e = 5, and ν = 10.
Three schemes are compared, namely, Best Channel Bidding
(BCB), Geni Aided (GA), and Non-Regret Learning (NRL).
In BCB, the users select to bid on the channel with the highest
channel gain. In GA, a Geni tells the SUs not to bid on the
channel that they would not win and instead to bid on the
other channels. The GA solution is thus the performance upper
bound for practical systems. We can see that the BCB has
the worst performance since the SUs might bid on the same
channel while the other channels are vacant. The proposed
NRL solution on the other hand, performs closely to the
GA solution, and can be easily implemented in a distributed
manner.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the problem of spectrum
access in single and multi-channel cognitive radio networks.
A repeated auction based framework has been adopted. In
single-channel spectrum access, SUs selectively participate in
the auction based on their valuation and past auction history.
This scheme has been shown to outperform a myopic scheme
in which SUs always compete. In multi-channel networks, a
non-regret approach has been proposed. Its performance has
7been shown to be significantly better than a naive greedy
solution and come close to that of the Geni aided solution.
As future work, we plan to improve on the convergence speed
and optimality of the proposed scheme. Also of interest is
the study of robust mechanisms for situations in which the
monitored information may be inaccurate.
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